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Financing behavior of R&D investments in the emerging markets: 
The role of alliance and financial system 
Abstract: This paper examines the financing behaviour of R&D investments in 
emerging markets. Drawing on institutional theory and using panel data of 
generalized methods of moment (GMM) estimation for a sample of 302 firms 
from 20 countries during the period 2003-2015, we find that emerging market 
firms tend to use internal funds for financing R&D investments. Interesting 
results emerged when the sample was divided as alliance and non-alliance firms, 
and bank-based and market-based financial systems. The results show that R&D 
financing behaves differently for alliance and non-alliance firms. Alliance firms 
use both internal and external funds for R&D investments, while non-alliance 
firms do not use external funds. We also document that a country’s financial 
system influences the choice of available sources of finance. Firms from countries 
that follow a bank-based financial system tend to rely on external funds while 
firms from countries that follow a market-based financial system depend more on 
internal funds for financing R&D investments. This study is important as it 
provides new evidence on financing R&D investments in emerging countries 
taking into account the institutional arguments of financing choices, and so 
should guide stakeholders about appropriate sources of R&D financing. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Investment in Research and Development (R&D) activities has long been treated as an 
important driver for economic growth. The average private rate of return from R&D 
investment may go as high as 30% (Hall, 1996) and the social return may go even further 
(Griliches, 1992) due to the possibility of spillover effect (Griffith et al., 2000). This stunning 
rate of return has encouraged thousands of firms across the globe to increase the investments 
in R&D activities. Both Narula and Martínez-Noya (2015) and Bakker (2013) confirmed the 
phenomenal growth of R&D investments over the last few decades. Researchers have long 
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been trying to explore the determinants for this spectacular growth and concluded that firm 
profitability, firm size, degree of capital intensity, exposure to international markets, degree 
of firm diversification, age of the firm, ownership structure, and market share are among the 
important internal firm-level factors that affect R&D investments (Anwar and Sun, 2013). 
Moreover, some external factors, such as sectoral variation and industry concentration 
(Anwar and Sun, 2013), national system of innovation, research clusters, and macro level 
innovation strategy (Howells, 2008) may also affect the R&D investments. Although we have 
a rich literature on determinants of R&D investments, the financing of R&D in emerging 
markets has been largely ignored in the literature (Sasidharan et al., 2015). However, it is 
apparent thatwith the growing scale of R&D investments, the financing of this has become an 
important issue for the finance and management scholars. A number of studies have 
confirmed that the financing of R&D is significantly different from the financing of other 
investments. Hall et al. (2016) stated that R&D is different from other forms of corporate 
investments for several reasons, including higher risk and uncertainty, opportunistic 
behaviours, moral hazards, and adverse selection. Considering this distinctive nature of R&D 
investment, a number of authors have examined the nature of financing of corporate R&D 
activities. Prominent among those are Hall (1992), Bhagat and Welch (1995), and Czarnitzki 
and Hottenrott (2011). However, these studies are mostly on developed markets and largely 
ignore the financing of R&D in emerging markets. This is against the backdrop of the 
significant importance of emerging markets from the context of increasing trends of R&D 
investments in those markets and the idiosyncratic market feature of the same. R&D 
Magazine (2016) reported that the growth of R&D expenditure in emerging markets is more 
than in developed markets. However, the financing of R&D in those countries should be 
different fromthe financing in developed countries due to differences in the institutional 
settings. Sasidharan et al. (2015) stated that frictions in financial markets in emerging 
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countries are more severe and therefore, should have a greater impact on R&D financing 
compared to developed markets. Sasidharan et al. (2015) also mentioned the inadequacy of 
research in exploring the financing of R&D in emerging markets. To fill this gap, this paper 
will examine the financing of R&D investments using firm-level data from a set of emerging 
countries. 
One of the notable features in modern day internationalization activities is the formation and 
growth of strategic alliances. Narula and Martínez-Noya (2015) pointed out that over the last 
three decades, R&D-based strategic alliances have been rising in number and volume. 
Although there was a preference for higher control entry modes in the case of R&D intensive 
firms in earlier times of internationalization, the choice is gradually shifting towards strategic 
alliances, as mentioned by Martínez-Noya and García-Canal (2011) and Satta et al. (2016). 
As the innovation process has become more complex recently due to mergers, acquisitions, 
and strategic alliances, R&D managers have had to be strategic and tactical and so require 
more interdisciplinary knowledge. To address this requirement, firms need greater flexibility 
and need to be working more closely with external partners to ensure and access 
complementary resources, reduce costs, and reduce time to market (Martínez-Noya et al., 
2012). There are specific benefits for R&D intensive firms to internationalize their activities 
through strategic alliances as suggested by Satta et al. (2016), and the benefits may even be 
greater for firms that have partners from emerging countries due to the possibility of low cost 
technology development, the availability of low cost talent, and the conducive environments 
in those emerging markets (UNCTAD, 2005; Jacob et al., 2013). As a result, the evidence 
shows that more than a third of global technology alliances during 2004-2008 were formed 
with partners from emerging markets (Jacob et al., 2013). Although the benefits of forming a 
strategic alliance for R&D intensive firms are well explained in the literature, we still do not 
know much about the financing of R&D in the case of strategic alliances. Therefore, it would 
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be interesting to see if there is any variation in R&D financing choices in the case of strategic 
alliances compared to non-alliance firms. The existence of well-functioning capital markets 
makes the choices for R&D financing relatively straightforward, as is evident from studies 
based on developed markets (Czarnitzki and Hottenrott, 2011). However, these results are not 
helpful to understand the financing in emerging markets, as Allen et al. (2012) pointed out 
that the size and role of a capital market is limited when it comes to allocating funds in 
emerging countries. However, Tong and Xu (2004) pointed out that in a weaker financial 
market, banks can be effective financing institutions, as they are able to make sure of the ex-
ante screening of R&D projects, which helps to mitigate information asymmetry. Considering 
this fact, it would be interesting to see how firms’ R&D financing behaves in a country that 
follows either a bank-based financial system or a capital market-based financial system. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section two presents the theory and hypothesis of the 
study. Section three introduces the data and research method. Section four presents the results 
and discussion and section five provides conclusion and implication of the study. 
2. Theory and Hypotheses: 
Institutional theory posits that the institutional settings of a country facilitate investment by 
providing incentives and supports, creating a stable environment, mitigating transaction costs, 
and reducing risk and uncertainty (North, 1990). R&D activities as a form of investment are 
also sensitive to institutional quality (Waarden, 2001). Wang et al. (2015) mentioned that the 
innovation of a firm’s activities can be influenced by institutions through laws, regulations, 
and policies. It has also been mentioned that institutions influence the cost of innovation 
inputs and protect the innovation outputs and thereby influence firms’ innovation activities. 
The financing of R&D is different from the financing of other traditional investment 
activities. Hall et al. (2016) stated that R&D investment suffers from a high level of 
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uncertainty, adverse selection, moral hazard, and agency problems. These problems are 
prominent in case of R&D investments, as these investments are characterized by contract 
incompleteness, opaqueness, and information asymmetry between firms and investors (Hall 
and Lerner, 2010). As a result, firms tend to finance R&D more with internal funds, as 
suggested by Myers and Majluf’s (1984) pecking order theory (Hall et al., 2016). External 
finance, and specifically debt, is not a favoured form of finance for R&D investment (Hall, 
1992; Lin et al., 2017). Hall (2002) concluded that a higher level of agency problem and 
information asymmetry in case of R&D investments increase the cost of external financing 
and makes the firm more reliant on internal finance. However, there is considerable evidence 
that institutional quality helps to mitigate frictions like the agency problem or the information 
asymmetry problem in financial markets (Claessens et al., 2014). Therefore, quality 
institutions should reduce the cost of capital by reducing financial frictions and should 
encourage the firms to use more funds from external sources to finance investments, 
including R&D investments. Although developed markets with high quality institutions may 
be better off using a greater amount of external funds to finance R&D investments, emerging 
economies may not have a similar opportunity due to the weaker quality of the economic 
institutions. Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013) pointed out that corporate governance practice is 
particularly poor in many emerging markets. More importantly, the possibility of managerial 
expropriation is higher in those economies due to the weak enforcement of legal rights. 
Therefore, in emerging countries, it is expected that firms would use fewer external funds to 
finance R&D activities to avoid agency and information asymmetry problems arising out of 
the weaker institutional quality of those markets. However, the problem of weaker economic 
institutions for the external financing of R&D activities should be relatively less prominent in 
countries that follow a bank-based economic model rather than market-based economic 
models. Mayer (1990) pointed out that financial decisions of financial systems based on the 
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“Anglo-Saxon” capital markets model differ from those based on a “Continental-German-
Japanese” banking model. The banking-based models are in favour of closer supervision of 
the clients, which eventually helps the firm to reduce some of the risks inherent in R&D 
investments. For example, Carlin and Mayer (2003) stated that a higher banking 
concentration would encourage more R&D investments for countries with weaker 
institutions. The reason behind this conclusion is intuitive. In countries where institutions are 
weaker, the banks help firms to screen the R&D projects ex-ante, and due to close 
supervision, the banks help to reduce the agency and information asymmetry problems. 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999) also stated that a bank-based financial system provides 
more credit facilities, promotes long-term relationships with firms, and resolves moral hazard 
problems. Thus, firms can easily obtain loans for long-term R&D investments. Based on the 
above discussion, this paper proposes the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: In emerging markets, where institutions are relatively weaker, a bank-based 
financial system would encourage firms to use more external funds to finance R&D. 
 
We have argued above that firms operating in a bank-based financial system would prefer to 
use more external funds (bank financing) as bank monitoring minimises the incidence of 
weaker institutional quality. However, this bias (preference for bank financing) may not be 
prominent in firms operating in market-based financial systems where the institutional quality 
is better. Strong economic and legal institutions encourage firms to raise funds from capital 
markets rather than relying solely on banks. Stronger institutions reduce the cost of financing 
by minimising the moral hazard problem and information asymmetry. They also protect both 
firms and investors from any potential investment and financing risks (LaPorta et al., 1998; 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2002). However, this may not be the case for R&D 
investments, as it has been documented that R&D investments involve a number of 
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limitations that make such investments relatively riskier compared to other forms of 
investment (Bakker, 2013). The situation is exacerbated in emerging markets, as the 
institutional quality in those countries is far lower than in developed countries (Peng et al., 
2008). Therefore, to avoid the enhanced level of risk associated with R&D investments in 
emerging markets, firms tend to depend more on internal sources of finance (Hall, 1992; 
Bakker, 2013). However, this heavy dependence on internal finance for R&D investments in 
emerging markets may not be applicable for firms that are involved in a strategic alliance. A 
strategic alliance brings together two or more independent firms through contractual 
agreements (Owen and Yawson, 2015). Todeva and Knoke (2005) pointed out that a strategic 
alliance helps firms to overcome the problems of weaker institutions, such as legal, political, 
and cultural barriers. Chou et al. (2014) stated that a strategic alliance helps firms to reduce 
transaction costs, accumulate more productive resources, send a positive signal to the market, 
reduce the information asymmetry, and reduce the cost of debt. These benefits, along with the 
possibility of organizational ambidexterity (Junni et al., 2013; Junni et al., 2015) in the case 
of strategic alliances (Lin et al., 2007), may help the firms to circumvent the barriers of 
weaker institutions in the emerging markets and attract exogenous lenders. Moreover, Gibson 
et al. (1997) concluded that the firms that benefit most from strategic alliances are bigger in 
general, and therefore, this creates the possibility of them seizing the opportunity to access 
more external funds to finance R&D investments. In addition to the greater proximity of 
external funds by firms involved in strategic alliances, internal funds are also prominent for 
those firms. An alliance is the result of resource integration among the firms, which provides 
new channels and opportunities to access new resources and improve such firms’ competitive 
advantages (Das and Teng, 2000; Wang and Chen, 2015). Therefore, it is expected that they 
will have more internal funds to invest in R&D. Based on the above discussion, the following 
hypothesis is proposed: 
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Hypothesis 2: As alliances have sufficient internal resources and multiple sources of funding, 
they use both internal and external funding for R&D investments. 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
We used the Thomson Reuter DataStream database to collect the data from 51 emerging 
markets1. To avoid sample selection bias, we considered all of the listed firms2 in an 
emerging market. We primarily searched 25,251 firms on DataStream. However, there were 
some missing values and unrealistic figures, so we dropped these3. To be included in the 
sample, the country had to have at least 2 firms, and the firms had to have data for 13 
consecutive years. Moreover, we tried to minimize gaps in or the lack of the latest data. 
Therefore, the sample periods were selected from 2003 to 2015. After considering the above 
issues, DataStream provided 302 firms from 20 emerging markets (see Table-I). We used 
balanced panel data for the sample firms because it made it possible to control for firm 
heterogeneity; and to give more information, more variability, and a greater degree of 
freedom; and to provide more efficient results. In addition, it was more suitable for 
identifying and measuring effects that are not detectable in pure cross-section or pure time 
series data (Baltagi, 2013). 
 
                                                          
1 The list of emerging markets may vary from one organisation to another. To avoid this problem, all emerging markets from 
all organisations’ lists (IMF, Goldman Sachs, FTSE, MSCI, The Economist, S&P, Dow Jones, BBVA, and Columbia 
University EMGP - 2013) were selected for this study (see Appendix). We excluded South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore 
from the sample because these countries are now considered as emerged countries. 
 
2We did not separate financial and non-financial firms. Although the nature of financial firms are different and may or may 
not offer the right products of R&D investment, the changing environment & competition drive them in innovation. 
Therefore, future research could solely be based on financial sectors. 
 
3There are large numbers of missing values of R&D investment on DataStream. One possible reason could be that R&D 
investment is hidden in marketing budgets. Moreover, due to the aggregate value of R&D, it is difficult to separate the 
budget for R spending and D spending. 
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Table 1: Sample by Country4 
Country 
No. of 
firms 
Percentage 
of  firms 
Cumulative 
percentage 
Hong Kong 62 20.53 20.53 
India 50 16.56 37.09 
Turkey 29 9.60 46.69 
China 22 7.28 53.97 
South Africa 22 7.28 61.26 
Israel 21 6.95 68.21 
Bangladesh 20 6.62 74.83 
Greece 19 6.29 81.13 
Malaysia 13 4.30 85.43 
Philippine 8 2.65 88.08 
Indonesia 7 2.32 90.40 
Sri Lanka 5 1.66 92.05 
Brazil 4 1.32 93.38 
Mexico 4 1.32 94.70 
Pakistan 4 1.32 96.03 
Russia 3 0.99 97.02 
Chile 3 0.99 98.01 
Peru 2 0.66 98.68 
Poland 2 0.66 99.34 
Thailand 2 0.66 100 
Total 302 100  100 
Source: Authors’ calculation  
 
Table II: Summary Variables 
Variables    Description 
R&D  R&D expenditure of the firm in a year (In log) 
Internal Fund  Internal Fund is measured by the ratio of cash flows to sales 
External Fund  External Fund is measured by the ratio of debt to total asset 
Size  Firm size is measured by total asset (In log) 
Sales growth  Annual sales growth of the firm 
Export oriented  Export oriented is dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm exports 
Foreign ownership  Percentage of foreign shareholders to total shareholders 
Alliance dummy  The alliances takes value 1 if it is Alliance firms, 0 otherwise 
Country dummy  The country takes value 1 if it is market-based, 0 if it is bank-based 
 
                                                          
4 To mitigate the potential bias from the dominant country in the sample, we separately ran regression for lower percentage 
of countries (Philippine, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Brazil, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, Chile, Peru, Poland, and Thailand). As our 
main interest of variables (internal fund and external fund) provides same results, we kept these countries for analysis. The 
results will provide upon request. 
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Table-II displays the definition of the variables. From the existing literature, the above listed 
variables have been found to have a significant effect on firms’ R&D investments. In this 
paper, following García-Quevedo et al. (2014), R&D expenditure is considered as a 
dependent variable which takes the logarithm of the annual R&D expenditure of the firms. 
The main independent variables are internal funds (Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994) and 
external funds (Aghion et al., 2004). The paper has used firm size, sales growth, export 
orientation, and foreign ownership as control variables as suggested by Lall (1983), Connolly 
and Hirschey (2005) and García-Quevedo et al., (2014). All variables are standardized to a 
common exchange rate: USD. Some of the explanatory variables had higher scales than 
others. Moreover, the absolute value of the variables increases the presence of 
heteroscedasticity (Grabowski, 1968). In order to avoid these problems, the natural logarithm 
of R&D, size variables, cash flow to sales ratio, debt to total asset ratio, and percentage of 
shareholders to foreigners are adopted. 
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Table III: Summary Statistics 
 
            (I) 
All firms 
 
Alliance firms 
(II) 
Non-Alliance firms   
 
Bank-based firms 
(III) 
Market-based firms    
Variables Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Mean 
Standard  
Deviation  
Diff.-in-
Means Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Mean 
Standard  
Deviation  
Diff.-in-
Means 
R&D 2.7680 1.5771 2.9453 1.5620 2.5368 1.5672 0.4085*** 2.7890 1.4580 2.7533 1.6558 0.0357*** 
Internal fund 12.1581 18.7055 12.0960 18.9771 12.2391 18.4845 -0.1430*** 11.8154 17.3549 12.3987 19.5982 -.5833*** 
External fund 0.2066 0.1841 0.1938 0.1678 0.2232 0.2021 -0.0294*** 0.2369 0.2155 0.1853 0.1549 0.0517*** 
Size 5.6906 0.8915 5.8338 0.8421 5.5038 0.9193 0.3299*** 5.4923 0.8947 5.8298 0.8626 -.3375 *** 
Sales growth 0.2145 3.2750 0.2084 4.0068 0.2225 1.9446 -0.0141* 0.1395 0.3528 0.2671 4.2620 -0.1276 
Export oriented 0.4641 0.4988 0.5431 0.4983 0.3610 0.4804 0.1821*** 0.5692 0.4953 0.3903 0.4879 0.1789*** 
Foreign ownership 14.0609 23.8713 17.5083 26.0701 9.5646 19.7788 7.9437 *** 10.2236 21.3269 16.7546 25.1635 -6.5310*** 
Alliance dummy 0.5660 0.4957 
    
  0.4591 0.4985 0.6411 0.4798 -.1819*** 
Country dummy 0.5875 0.4923 0.6654 0.4719 0.4860 0.5000 0.1795***           
Source: Authors’ calculation 
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Table-III reports the summary statistics (Mean and Standard Deviation) of all the variables 
used for analysis. Column I shows that internal finance has a higher average than external 
finance, which indicates that emerging market firms tend to rely more on internal funds. 
Investors are more interested in emerging markets due to their growing importance. Thus, 
levels of foreign ownership in the emerging markets are higher. Summary statistics for the 
sub-samples of alliance and non-alliance firms are presented in Column II. Difference-in-
means tests show that alliance firms differ significantly from non-alliance firms in all 
dimensions. Consistent with the findings by Levi (2005), the summary statistics show that 
alliance firms are more R&D intensive than non-alliance firms. The table also shows that 
alliance firms are bigger in size compared to non-alliance firms, as suggested by Gibson et al. 
(1997). Column III reports the summary statistics for sub-samples of firms from bank-based 
financial systems5 and market-based financial systems. From Table III, it is also evident that 
firms from two different financial systems are significantly different in terms of selected 
variables, except for sales growth. 
 
3.2 Model 
In order to examine the financing behaviour of R&D investment, the following model is 
proposed. We have used a semi-logarithmic model for our analysis because sales growth 
contains some negative values; thus, we cannot use the logarithm of these values. Therefore, 
the model for our analysis is as follows: 
In(RD it ) = α i  + β 1 (Internal Fund it ) + β 2 (External Fund it ) + β 3 In(Size it ) +β 4 (Sales    
growth it ) + β 5 (Export oriented it )  +β 6 (Foreign ownership it )+  η i  +C i  +  M i +ε it  
                                                          
5Bangladesh, Indonesia, India, Israel, Greece, Pakistan and Sri Lanka are considered to follow a bank-based financial system 
while Brazil, China, Chili, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippine, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Turkey and 
Thailand are considered to follow the market-based financial systems (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1999 ; Allen et al., 2012; 
World Bank, 1991). 
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Individual heterogeneity is important for this analysis because R&D investment decisions 
fully depend on a firm’s specificity, such as strategy, firm culture, and the propensity to 
innovate (Hillier et al., 2011; Pindado et al., 2015). Thus, there is a probability of obtaining 
biased results. To obtain unbiased results, we need to control for individual heterogeneity. 
Therefore, we have taken η i  as the individual effects in our model and then eliminated it by 
taking the first differences of the variables. Besides individual firm effects, we also include 
the country dummies, market dummies, and time dummies in the empirical model. Country 
dummies capture the country-specific effects, market dummies capture the market-specific 
effects, and time dummies capture the time-varying effect that controls the macroeconomic 
variables on a firm’s value. Moreover, we consider ε it as the random disturbance, which is 
assumed to be i.i.d normal. 
 
3.3. Method of Study 
Some of the independent variables in the model are endogenous, which may create an 
endogeneity problem. For example, firm size and R&D investments causality may run in both 
directions. Endogeneity can also arise as a result of measurement errors and omitted 
variables. To control the endogeneity problem, we have estimated the model using the 
generalized methods of moment (GMM) technique. In addition to this, Worrall (2008) stated 
that, within a single framework, GMM nests several estimations, such as OLS, 2SLS, and IV. 
For this estimation, we have used lagged levels t-1, t-2, and t-3 as the instruments for the 
difference equation, and one lag as the instruments for the level equation, as we applied the 
two-step system GMM. We applied the system GMM because it has been found to be more 
efficient than the difference GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998). Moreover, the difference 
GMM estimation has the problem of weak instruments (Alonso-Borrego and Arellano, 1999). 
We performed the two-step GMM estimation on the grounds that it produces more efficient 
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estimates compared with the one-step estimation. In the two-step estimation, the standard 
covariance matrix is robust to panel-specific heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, but the 
standard errors are downward biased. To fix the possible downward bias, we applied the 
Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample corrected covariance matrix. 
 
We included the lagged value of the dependent variable in the right hand side as a regressor. 
Use of the traditional fixed effect technique is biased in the presence of a lagged dependent 
variable as a regressor. Moreover, the presence of the lagged dependent variable may give 
rise to autocorrelation problems. Due to the first difference transformation, there might be 
first-order autocorrelation AR(1), but this would not create a specification problem with the 
GMM model. The results show that the null hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation 
AR(1) is rejected. However, the test for second-order autocorrelation AR(2) means it is not 
possible to reject the null hypothesis, which indicates that there is no second order 
autocorrelation in our model. 
However, one major issue of using the GMM technique is to find valid and relevant 
instruments. We used the Hansen J statistic of over identifying restrictions to test whether the 
instruments are valid, i.e., they are uncorrelated with the error terms. The results show that 
the instruments are valid and relevant in our model. In addition to this, we performed the two 
Wald tests: (i) z 1  is a test of the joint significance of the regressors, and (ii) z 2 is a test of the 
joint significance of the time dummies, suggesting that aggregate factors exert a significant 
influence on the relationship between R&D investments and the explanatory variables. The 
results show that the two Wald tests provide a good result for our model. 
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4. Results and Discussion 
Table-IV presents the econometric results of the GMM estimation. In column I, as can be 
seen, R&D investment is highly persistent in the emerging markets. This implies that about 
81% of past R&D behaviour affects the current level of R&D investments. The result is 
consistent with the R&D smoothing idea and is similar to findings from Sasidharan et al. 
(2015). The results from column I also confirm our general prediction that emerging market 
firms do not tend to use external funds to finance R&D, as is evident from the statistically 
significant negative coefficient for the variable. This is consistent with the general prediction 
that, due to information asymmetry, adverse selection, and agency problems, R&D 
investments tend to be riskier than other forms of investment and therefore, it becomes hard 
to find external funds to finance R&D in emerging markets. The result is consistent with 
earlier findings by Brown et al. (2012) and Hall et al. (2016). Control variables, such as firm 
size, sales growth, and export orientation, are found to be important determinants for R&D 
investments. Firm size has a significant positive impact on R&D investment in the emerging 
markets. The results indicate that larger firms make greater R&D investments. Lall (1983) 
found similar results. Sales growth increases a firm’s probability of engaging in R&D 
investments. This indicates that the greater the market demand, the greater the percentage of 
the expenditure will be allocated to R&D. Firms with a higher export orientation are more 
likely to engage in R&D investments. Outward-oriented firms will be more aware of new 
technologies and will also strive harder to keep their technologies more competitive (Lall, 
1983). Anwar and Sun (2013) reached the same conclusion based on Chinese electrical 
appliances and industries. 
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Column II reports the results for bank-based and market-based finance. We hypothesized that 
firms from a bank-based financial system should use more external finance due to the 
possibility of enhanced monitoring and reduced agency and information asymmetry 
Table IV: Results  
Variables 
(I) 
 
All Firms 
                    (II) 
 
Bank-based Market-based 
              (III) 
 
Alliance Non-Alliance 
R&D 1−t  0.8113*** 0.7700*** 0.7388*** 0.6631*** 0.9060*** 
  (0.0332) (0.0575) (0.0511) (0.0631) (0.0287) 
Internal fund 0.0002 -0.0008 0.0026* 0.0016* -0.0008 
  (0.0010) (0.0018) (0.0015) (0.0018) (0.0011) 
External fund -0.3097** 0.3325** -0.4637** 0.2815* -0.2745** 
  (0.1024) (0.1549) (0.2342) (0.2790) (0.1156) 
Size 0.1579** 0.1950** 0.2013** 0.2837** 0.0746* 
  (0.0497) (0.0679) (0.0838) (0.0995) (0.0430) 
Sales growth 0.0420** 0.1341** 0.0417** 0.0575* 0.0428** 
  (0.0147) (0.0682) (0.0152) (0.0323) (0.0206) 
Export oriented 0.1864* 0.3497** 0.0440 0.3317** 0.0021 
  (0.1070) (0.1443) (0.1629) (0.1807) (0.0809) 
Foreign ownership 0.0001 -0.0033** 0.0031** 0.0027** -0.0002 
  (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0010) 
Market dummy Yes Yes Yes   
Country dummy Yes    Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Total observations 3542 1459 2083 2009 1533 
AR(1) -5.23 -4.35 -3.83 -4.16 -4.75 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
AR(2) 1.31 1.66 0.99 1.33 -0.39 
P-value 0.19 0.108 0.324 0.259 0.696 
z 1  191.35(9) 89.07(8) 65.77(8) 44.17(8) 321.27(8) 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
z 2  2.5(12) 2.93(12) 1.84(12) 1.63(12) 1.79(12) 
P-value 0.0038 0.0013 0.0805 0.0872 0.0559 
Hansen 287.59 (270) 98.83(268) 168.41(258) 159.21(263) 120.7(259) 
P-value 0.221 0.857 0.912 0.989 0.991 
Significance levels: * <0.10, ** <0.05, ***<0.01; Standard errors in parenthesis. 
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problems. The results are consistent with the general prediction stated in hypothesis 1. We 
found a statistically significant positive coefficient for external finance in case of bank based 
financial system. This is consistent with earlier results of Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999), 
Carlin and Mayer (2003), and Davydov (2016). The results also show that firms from a 
market-based system rely more on internal sources rather than external sources to finance 
R&D due to the fact that in emerging markets, the cost of borrowing from capital markets 
would be higher due to weak financial institutions (Booth et al., 2001; Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 2002). With regard to the other regressors, firm size, sales growth, and foreign 
ownership in both bank-based and market-based finance systems significantly affect R&D 
investments. Moreover, both bank-based and market-based finance firms show higher 
persistence rates in R&D investments. 
Column III presents the results for alliance and non-alliance firms in emerging markets. After 
controlling for the financial systems of a country, the results show that the financing of R&D 
differs in alliance and non-alliance firms. This result implies that resource access and external 
networks play a role in R&D financing. Alliances use both internal and external funding for 
R&D investments. As alliances have more internal resources and better access to finance, 
they may use both sources for R&D financing. Brown and Peterson’s (2009) study also 
emphasized the use of both internal and external finance sources for R&D investments. These 
results support Hypothesis 2. On the other hand, the results show that external funding 
negatively affects non-alliance firms, meaning that non-alliance firms do not use external 
funding for R&D investments. This is because non-alliance firms are relatively small and find 
it difficult to obtain external funding for non-collateralisable and long-term R&D projects. 
With regard to the other regressors, the R&D investments of both types of firms depend on 
export performance and foreign ownership, while non-alliance firms’ R&D is affected by 
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their size and sales growth. Moreover, both non-alliance firms and alliance firms show a 
higher persistence of R&D investments. 
5. Conclusion and Implications 
The spectacular growth of R&D investments in emerging economies in recent times made us 
consider the sources of the financing of the same. This is important, as the very nature of 
R&D investment differs from other traditional forms of corporate investment. Drawing on 
institutional theory in general, this paper has explored the sources of financing for R&D 
activities by emerging market firms. The study has used firm-level data from twenty 
emerging markets and has used the GMM estimation method to find out the effects of 
institutions on the financing of R&D by emerging market firms. The general conclusion is 
that firms in emerging markets tend to rely more on internal sources of finance to carry out 
R&D investments. This is consistent with the view that poor institutions in emerging markets 
make external financing costly. The study has also found that firms from countries that 
follow a bank-based financial system rely more on external funding (mostly bank borrowing) 
to finance their R&D activities. This is consistent with the notion that bank finance reduces 
information asymmetry and agency problems through an enhanced level of monitoring 
(Davydov, 2016). The results also show that alliance firms use both external and internal 
funds to finance R&D activities. Alliance firms have greater access to capital markets due to 
their ability to create several benefits including the creation of resources, the lower cost of 
debt, and sending a positive signal to the market (Chou et al. 2014). The findings of this study 
have important academic and policy implications. The study contributes to the academic 
literature by identifying the preferred sources of R&D financing for firms operating in 
emerging markets. The results of this study particularly suggest that due to institutional 
weakness, emerging market firms rely more on internal funds to finance R&D. We have 
found two exceptions to this general finding. First, if the financial system is primarily bank 
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based, firms tend to rely more on bank financing to support R&D activities despite the 
existence of weaker institutions. Second, firms from emerging markets with weaker 
institutions may create strategic alliance with foreign firms to enable them to raise funds from 
capital markets to support R&D investments. The results of this study should provide 
guidance to the policy makers to create a conducive environment for supporting R&D 
investments. It is widely accepted that R&D is mostly financed by internal sources. However, 
internal finance has its own limitations (Hottenrott and Peters, 2012). Therefore, to support 
firms to use cheaper external sources of financing, policy makers should seriously think of 
making the institutions stronger. Moreover, as we have found that creating strategic alliance 
enables firms to access external funds, more support should be provided to local firms so that 
the formation of alliances becomes easier. 
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Appendix 1: List of Emerging Countries 
  IMF 
Goldman 
Sachs 
BRICS+N11 FTSE MSCI The Economist S&P Dow Jones BBVA 
Columbia 
University 
EMGP 
Argentina √ 
     
√ √ √ 
Bahrain 
      
√ √ 
 
Bangladesh 
 
√ 
     
√ 
 
Brazil √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Bulgaria √ 
     
√ √ 
 
Chile √ 
 
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
China √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Colombia 
  
√ √ √ √ √ √ 
 
Czech Republic 
  
√ √ √ √ √ √ 
 
Egypt 
 
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
 
Estonia √ 
     
√ √ 
 
Greece 
   
√ 
     
Hong Kong 
    
√ 
    
Hungary √ 
 
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
India √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Indonesia √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
 
Iran 
 
√ 
       
Israel 
        
√ 
Jordan 
      
√ √ 
 
Kuwait 
      
√ √ 
 
Latvia √ 
     
√ √ 
 
Lithuania √ 
     
√ √ 
 
Malaysia √ 
 
√ √ √ √ √ √ 
 
Mauritius 
      
√ √ 
 
Mexico √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Morocco 
  
√ 
 
√ √ √ √ 
 
Nigeria 
 
√ 
     
√ 
 
Oman 
      
√ √ 
 
Pakistan √ √ √ 
   
√ √ 
 
Peru √ 
 
√ √ √ √ √ √ 
 
Philippines √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
 
Poland √ 
 
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Qatar 
      
√ √ 
 
Romania √ 
     
√ √ 
 
Russia √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Saudi Arabia 
    
√ 
    
Singapore 
    
√ 
    
Slovakia 
      
√ √ 
 
Slovenia 
        
√ 
South Africa √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Sri Lanka 
      
√ √ 
 
South Korea 
 
√ 
  
√ 
  
√ √ 
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Sudan 
       
√ 
 
Taiwan 
  
√ 
 
√ √ 
 
√ √ 
Thailand √ 
 
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Turkey √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Tunisia 
       
√ 
 
UAE 
  
√ 
   
√ √ 
 
Ukraine √ 
      
√ 
 
Venezuela √ 
      
√ 
 
Vietnam 
 
√ 
        
